What the "day after" in Gaza must look like
As Israel cannot and will not remain in the Gaza Strip permanently, it needs an exit strategy. Because history teaches us that withdrawal does not automatically bring peace and security.
The future of the Gaza Strip must be discussed now. It is crucial that this debate about what the Strip should look like after the war is no longer put on the back burner. Because the lack of a sustainable plan prevents the residents of Gaza from having a real future, and it endangers Israel for generations to come. Without a plan, there is a risk of further clashes and wars.
As Israeli tanks recapture the Gaza Strip, the discussion about withdrawal has already begun. It should not be forgotten that Israel has already withdrawn from Gaza twice: in 1994, following the Oslo Accords, there was a withdrawal from the cities and a large part of the Gaza Strip, followed by the complete and unilateral withdrawal in 2005 under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
This time, before Israel withdraws from Gaza for the third time, it will need to ensure that no new threats develop there that would force it to reoccupy Gaza and then withdraw again. To achieve this, Israel can no longer afford to ignore the lessons of the past.
History shows that an occupation followed by insecurity and a lack of clearly achievable goals risks resistance, guerrilla warfare and prolonged conflict. For the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular, a unilateral withdrawal does not seem to guarantee peace and security for either side. Israel must ensure that before it withdraws, there is a partner that takes responsibility for the territory and is willing to demilitarize Gaza and stop terrorism. If the end of the war does not lead to peace and security for both nations, we will continue to see a cycle of terrorism, occupation and disengagement every few years.
Withdrawal does not automatically bring peace
In the most recent disengagement from Gaza in 2005, Israel transferred security and civilian control to the Palestinian Authority (PA) of President Mahmoud Abbas. However, as a result of a Hamas military coup in 2007, the Gaza Strip effectively became an independent state controlled by a terrorist organization hostile to both Israel and the PA.
The Palestinian Authority was unable to control the Gaza Strip. But what consequences did it draw from this? Unfortunately, over the years, the PA has not proven that it wants to take back responsibility for the Gaza Strip. On the contrary, in practice it has strengthened Hamas by maintaining financial support for the terrorists. On an ideological level, the PA has never distanced itself from the values of jihad. Consequently, it continues to brainwash generations of Palestinian schoolchildren by preserving incitement against Israel in its textbooks. [Despite the enmity between Hamas and the PA, schools in the Gaza Strip use the textbooks of the Palestinian Authority.]
Israel was mistaken in thinking that a unilateral withdrawal from Gaza would automatically bring peace and security to its citizens. The critical stages of the war in Gaza may soon be over. Israel will probably achieve a considerable part of its military objectives. It will have dealt significant blows to the terrorist groups and weakened, if not wiped out, the enemy. Since Israel has already declared that it does not want to remain in Gaza permanently, it needs a clear exit strategy.
Three phases
Once the current battle is over, the residents of Gaza will face a grim reality of immense losses and dwindling hope. The people of Gaza deserve to have a vision and hope for the future, an idea of what their lives might look like in the post-Hamas era. The situation caused by the horrific terrorist attacks of October 7 and the tragedy facing the people of Gaza today - all of this horror commits us to creating a better future. To achieve this, both sides must renounce extremism of any kind.
So what might the exit strategy look like? Devising a long-term solution involves a three-phase plan:
The preventive phase (at least one year) focuses on neutralizing the capabilities of Hamas and other terrorist organizations in Gaza, with an emphasis on destroying the military infrastructure and disarming Gaza. At the same time, war criminals will be brought to justice and the price of terror will be demonstrated (also in the West Bank) in order to achieve long-term deterrence - accompanied by maximum humanitarian aid.
The stabilization phase (three to five years): The IDF withdraws from urban centers and is replaced by international troops. Borders and crossings are re-established, including the construction of an underground fence along the Egypt-Gaza border to prevent arms smuggling. At the same time, efforts are focused on reviving daily life, boosting the local economy and establishing credible Palestinian representatives who support the demilitarization of Gaza. Local Palestinian representatives, Israel and the international community form a committee to discuss, organize and implement an effective and sustainable reconstruction plan.
A democratization process is initiated to encourage Palestinians to overcome Hamas ideology - similar to the denazification process carried out by the Western Allies in Germany after the Second World War. The people of Gaza elect and install an interim government (until a constitution is drafted) to represent the Gazan public in the reconstruction process. In parallel, a democratic constitution is drafted, which also accepts the disarmament of the Gaza Strip.
The reconstruction phase (three to five years) involves the complete Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip to the international borders and the establishment of a local political system based on a constitution and free and democratic elections. Industrial zones and welfare initiatives financed by investors will be created to build an employment infrastructure. Furthermore, desalination plants, sewage systems and an independent power plant are being built. This phase aims to create the conditions for the establishment of seaports and airports, with security supervision provided either by Israel or by an internationally agreed body.
How quickly the move from one phase to the next will depend on the cooperation of the people of Gaza and on their distancing themselves from terrorism. To the extent that Gazans support disarmament and prioritize educating future generations for peace - measurable through surveys and research - the faster responsibility for their territory and population will be transferred.
The implementation of the plan requires a solid joint effort led by the US and the international community. It also requires an agreement and a bold partnership with the Arab countries, especially Egypt and the Gulf States.
The plan formulated here is no guarantee of easy or quick success. However, it contains the ingredients to find a sustainable and long-term solution for relations between Israel and the Gaza Strip. At this stage, the plan does not claim to offer a solution to the conflict with the Palestinians in the West Bank. But if it is successful, it can mobilize the necessary trust in both Israel and the West Bank.
The author: Uri Halperin is a reserve colonel in the Israeli army, he served as an intelligence officer in the IDF's Southern Command (responsible for Gaza) and from 2006 to 2010 as an intelligence assistant to two Israeli prime ministers, later as Israeli military attaché to NATO.
Read also:
- Year of climate records: extreme is the new normal
- Precautionary arrests show Islamist terror threat
- UN vote urges Israel to ceasefire
- SPD rules out budget resolution before the end of the year
Guest contributions to this discussion should consider the role of Hamas in the Gaza Strip after Israel's potential withdrawal. The presence of Hamas, a terrorist organization hostile to both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, has posed significant challenges after previous Israeli withdrawals.
In light of Israel's third potential withdrawal from Gaza, it's essential to address the issue of guest contributions in the context of ensuring a reliable partner to take responsibility for the territory and stop terrorism. The absence of such a partner could potentially lead to a repeat of the cycle of terrorism, occupation, and disengagement every few years.
Source: www.ntv.de