Additional NATO members will participate in France's plan.

Additional NATO nations will participate in France's plan.

The conversation surrounding Russia's hostile war against Ukraine in Germany is deemed 'especially impractical' thanks to Chancellor Scholz's persistent apprehensions, per NATO expert Stefanie Babst. Babst contends that additional NATO nations will likely follow France's lead and ship trainers to Ukraine. Nonetheless, she considers Germany to be outside the pro-active coalition.

Babst remarks that some Western nations are forbidding Ukraine from targeting Russian bases with their weapons. This leaves the Ukrainian military forces to continue engaging in battle with their hands tied. The justifications behind these constraints are typically political. Scholz and US President Biden are both caught up in the election campaign, "both worried they won't be re-elected if Russia's war outshines their political platforms excessively."

ntv.de: How do you perceive France's desire to dispatch trainers to Ukraine?

Stefanie Babst: I've been waiting for this announcement and can't wait for both sides to formally agree. I also find it incredibly advantageous that other NATO countries are considering the same. This would be a substantial advance, albeit a fairly complex undertaking.

Is France the first country to suggest deploying trainers to Ukraine?

It appears that way. French trainers are anticipated to visit Ukraine to inspect the instructional facilities first. Afterward, they will provide coaching to Ukrainian soldiers on location. Naturally, the specific details regarding when and where, which weapon systems, and under what conditions will all be discussed among the involved parties. For the Ukrainian military, Western instruction assistance on-site would be a refuge, as they wouldn't have to continually send their soldiers to different nations for instruction. This takes up time, energy, and manpower that could be better utilized on crucial battlefronts. And from a political and strategic standpoint, Western training support would be a significant step.

How significant would that be?

Since I anticipate that other NATO countries will emulate France's initiative. In the end, it will likely be a coalition of the willing that goes through with this move and decisively communicates their lack of willingness to surrender Ukraine to the Russian aggressor.

Which countries might be involved?

Chiefly those nations that have consistently demonstrated their support for this endeavor: Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, perhaps even the Finns, the British, and the Poles. Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis announced last week that Lithuania is prepared to join a French-led coalition and furnish army trainers to Ukraine.

Does France's decision have anything to do with Macron's statement from February? At that point, he stated, "we shouldn't rule out any options" regarding Ukraine.

Macron made a solid argument for strategic ambiguity: We should intentionally keep Russia in the dark about our next steps while simultaneously endeavoring to urge Russia back into Europe in a more firm manner. Previously, the French Chief of Staff Pierre Schill disseminated a document to some NATO allies outlining various options for how NATO nations might help Ukraine more effectively. These suggestions have not gathered much traction in Germany; neither politically nor within the public sphere.

In Germany, the focus has largely been on whether NATO partners should dispatch ground troops to Ukraine. Chancellor Scholz plainly stated, "I will not send soldiers from our Bundeswehr to Ukraine."

In truth, this is a deliberately misleading portrayal. No one from the allied nations has suggested deploying Western ground troops as combat units. This alternative isn't even being considered. However, if Mr. Scholz rules out German participation in "ground troops," many individuals interpret this as an endorsement of combat military actions and thus feel alarmed. However, that's completely unrelated!

Would NATO soldiers - and if they were trainers - not become participants in the war?

No. We're referring to bundling military training support on location, which we've been providing to the Ukrainians for two years. In fact, we coach Ukrainian soldiers in Poland, Great Britain, and Germany. We haven't triggered a conflict by doing so, but we are assisting Ukraine in exercising its right to self-defense, articulated in Article 51 of the UN Charter. Conveniently, the United States also boasts "advisory personnel" in Ukraine, which they tend to keep under wraps.

The German discussion appears particularly unstrategic, as Scholz constantly expresses anxiety that "a huge war will break out there," as he recently stated. It's wearisome for Ukrainians and me to witness these statements being used politically in Germany.

The situation at hand is not a competition among accountants. Instead, it is about finding the most effective solutions to face the significant strategic shift since the end of the war. It's also about the military and political effects of our military aid to Russia's military terror toward Ukraine.

Consider this: If you insist on viewing the entire scenario in terms of bookkeeping, it's only fair to note that Germany, relative to its GDP, is in the middle of the list of supporting nations.

Shouldn't we prioritize equipping Ukraine at a faster and more robust rate?

It's clear that Ukraine requires more effective weaponry. However, promises from the West to arm Ukraine have been made for over two years, and they've still not been fulfilled. If we had sent enough air defense systems, for instance, there wouldn't be any bombings affecting markets, schools, or kindergartens. Similarly, if we had provided sufficient artillery ammunition, long-range guided weapons, and short-range missiles like ATACMS, the frontline would probably look quite different now. However, it's important to remember that we can't just focus on one solution. Certain European countries, such as France, seem ready to take the first step to break free from their reactive stance toward Moscow. Constantly promising more money and weapons, but conditional, delayed, and with numerous restrictions, isn't a recipe for effectively stemming Putin's assault in Ukraine.

What are your thoughts on the general atmosphere in NATO member states?

Through the years I've spent at NATO headquarters, I've cultivated a substantial network that includes connections with government officials or institutions in several NATO countries, alongside my current post in Brussels. I frequently share my opinions with these individuals. I'm pleased that the case for a consistent containment strategy against Russia and its supporters is gaining traction.

Has Germany pursued a containment strategy against Russia?

No, we haven't. The central tenets of the German government's policy include "supporting Ukraine 'as long as necessary'" and not "supporting a 'dictated peace.'" The specifics might vary based on which officials from the traffic light coalition you speak to.

Regarding the United States' stance, their Secretary of State, Blinken, famously advised, "We would not prohibit Ukraine from attacking Russian targets with American weapons. We would not, however, encourage Ukraine to do so." President Zelenskyy has repeatedly called on the US to remove the prohibition, but the situation remains unclear.

So, is there a prohibition or not?

Essentially, nations providing Ukraine with specific weapons systems can impose limitations on their use, referred to as "caveats." While both the United States and Germany have restricted Ukraine's ability to strike Russian targets on their territory, other NATO countries, such as Poland, the Baltic Republics, and France, have taken a different approach. In a polarized political climate in Washington, some politicians support Ukraine attacking military targets in Russia, while others, including the current administration, advocate maintaining their restrictions. This dilemma leaves the Ukrainians in a tricky predicament.

Why do the Ukrainians adhere to these constraints?

President Zelenskyy wants to maintain positive relationships with his biggest supporters. Furthermore, these restrictions place limitations on the Ukrainian armed forces, forcing them to keep fighting with their hands tied. The political motivations behind the restrictions are often the primary concern for various Western allies. For example, the Ukrainian armed forces effectively sank or severely damaged Russian warships using their own UAVs in the Black Sea, which generated appreciation in Washington.

However, when the Ukrainians started attacking Russian oil storage depots and refineries, the US criticized them. Their actions were seen as potentially harmful to US interests due to concerns about oil prices. This led to the military success of the Ukrainians being overshadowed by the backlash in Washington.

From a military standpoint, it's universally recognized that one should target an enemy's weak points, such as supply lines, logistics hubs, launch ramps, depots, and the like. However, when we see that Russia is transporting new war materials by rail to the northern front, the fact that some allies are still prohibiting the Ukrainians from attacking these shipments is rather perplexing. The Ukrainians are undoubtedly frustrated about the restrictions imposed on them by certain Western allies.

Scholz has drawn a red line, but what can Ukraine do besides agree and express appreciation for Germany's weapon deliveries? In practice, Scholz's rules haven't been upheld on the battlefield. Instead, they've given the Russians significant military advantages and put the Ukrainians at a disadvantage. The Chancellor's perspective on war is drastically different from reality. His blasé "agreement" doesn't convey an understanding that these agreements impact the lives and deaths of Ukrainian soldiers.

What are Biden and Scholz truly afraid of: their voters or Putin escalating the situation with nukes? Both are immersed in election campaigns and fear being unre-elected if they allow Russia's war to dominate their agendas significantly. As a result, they aim to keep as much distance from the war as possible. Their voters ought to perceive Moscow's aggression as distant and manageable. The grim reality of the daily consequences of the war holds little importance for them. If Biden and Scholz openly admitted, "A fierce war is raging in the heart of Europe, directly affecting our security. Accordingly, we plan to jointly defeat Russia with Ukraine militarily. This is our goal. However, to subdue Russia in Ukraine, we must be willing to take some risks," there would be risks, though acceptable ones. For instance, France and other NATO allies offering trainers to Ukraine is a complex undertaking requiring thorough consideration and entails certain risks.

Not only has Putin been hinting at the nuclear threat for two years, but this should be patently apparent by now. This is a useful argument for both the German and American governments. It allows them to justify why they're not willing to undertake certain actions, such as inviting Ukraine to NATO accession talks or furnishing Taurus missiles.

Another point of contention is the absence of NATO action since the start of the war. There's been no progress on sending trainers or allowing Ukraine to target areas beyond its borders. Additionally, there's the unresolved issue of a no-fly zone.

A no-fly zone wasn't technically the goal when Ukraine requested one at the war's outset. It was unanimously rejected by NATO members, and the stance hasn't changed since. If individual allies or German politicians argue for protections over Ukrainian airspace, they're typically referring to western Ukraine. This could involve deploying air defense systems like Patriot batteries in Poland or Romania. How this would work operationally and which nations would participate remains under consideration by some NATO capitals, while Berlin may not be interested.

Restricting certain actions to the western Ukraine would involve protecting its airspace with air defense systems housed in NATO territories. The logistics of executing this operation are being pondered by certain NATO headquarters. It's doubtful Berlin will join them.