"Ukrainians and Russians face each other near Vovchansk like in Stalingrad"
In Donbass, Ukrainians and Russians are fiercely fighting over the smallest village. However, Putin's troops are consistently making progress. In the sky over Eastern Europe, the Kreml is also active against NATO. Colonel Reisner explains to ntv.de how the Russians are able to disrupt Western planes.
ntv.de: The Russian army has reportedly taken control of two settlements in the past few days - Nowoolexandriwka and Spirne. The Ukraine denies this, however. How does the situation look from your perspective?
Markus Reisner: The Russians have taken the initiative along the entire front, meaning they determine where the fighting is taking place through their attacks. In two heavyweight areas, they are making steady progress: on the one hand in the area of Tschassiw Jar and at Otscheretyne in Donbass. These are the locations of the named settlements, Nowoolexandriwka and Spirne. A significant portion of the territory in the area of Tschassiw Jar is on the eastern bank of the Donbass Canal. This part is almost completely in the possession of the Russians. The major challenge for the Russian troops is to make the leap over the canal. We will experience intense fighting in the coming weeks in this regard. On the other hand, the Russian forces are making progress approximately 100 km south of Tschassiw Jar in their incursion into the second defensive line of the Ukrainians at Otscheretyne. They are expanding it. The "Flower," so called by the Russians, has begun "to bloom." Smaller settlements with 500 to 1000 inhabitants, whose names one has never heard of, are being fiercely contested. They eventually fall to the Russians after weeks of fighting and are reduced to rubble on the ground.
How quickly are they advancing there?
These are not long distances, sometimes only 100 meters, sometimes 500 or even a kilometer, but the effect adds up in a war of attrition. The Russians employ the following tactic: The Russian troops do not only shoot with artillery and rocket launchers, but deliberately drop bombs. With their enormous explosive power, they can eliminate entire Ukrainian strongholds and then launch an attack. Smaller units then come into play. One or two armored personnel carriers, a tank, often also four to five motorcycles or small, agile buggies.
What are motorcycles doing at the front?
The Russians use motorcycles to quickly overcome the extensive open areas. They penetrate suspected Ukrainian positions, check if the terrain is clear, and can then bring reinforcements forward. This successful tactic, despite heavy losses, originated from Motorradaufklärungsbataillone during World War II. When we consider the operational level, that is, the broader perspective on the front, it looks like this: In Donbass, the Russians are making progress and pushing the Ukrainians back slowly. In the Charkiw region, however, the Ukrainians are still managing to hold the Russians at bay and even push them back in some places, such as Lipzy. At Wowtschansk, however, we see bitter and relentless fighting. The Russians recently even had to withdraw a paratrooper brigade from there. The Ukrainians and the Russians are practically facing each other, eye to eye, in a Stalingrad-like situation, and are fighting fiercely and tenaciously.
When we look beyond the front: A British data analysis states that in the first four months of this year, 142 transportation and surveillance flights of the Royal Air Force were disrupted by GPS interference from the Royal Air Force. Out of a total of 504 flights that took place over Eastern Europe. The British Defense Ministry holds Russia accountable, making them responsible for disrupting every fourth British flight over Eastern Europe. Can NATO defend against this?
This has been the case for months, particularly over the Baltic region, where the Russians apparently intend to deliberately disrupt the electromagnetic spectrum. Civil aviation also reports GPS failures in this area. This is a hybrid warfare capability that Russia possesses and employs, while NATO is unsure of how to counter it.
Without being an expert in aviation: The failure of GPS in an aircraft sounds dangerous.
This is particularly true for civilian aviation, which is primarily dependent on GPS coordinates. There have been no major incidents reported yet, but there have been several reports of such disruptions. Many of these attacks are believed to originate from Kaliningrad. This is the Russian enclave south of the Baltic Sea, between Poland and Lithuania. There, Russia has stationed a significant amount of electronic warfare equipment. This should concern us. The same goes for Russian ships that are near undersea cables. There are always suspicions that the Russians could be preparing or carrying out sabotage on data cables or oil pipelines.
Once again, regarding aircraft: How can the crew cope if GPS fails during a flight?
The autopilot automatically reports that it is no longer receiving a signal. Then, manual control is engaged. This can also be done visually if the pilot is not in the middle of the night in a cloud cover. In such a case, it would indeed be dangerous. Alternatively, communication on radio frequencies for flight control support can be used. A civilian passenger plane cannot be brought down to disaster by the Russians for this purpose. I cannot imagine that at the moment. They simply make it as difficult as possible for NATO reconnaissance planes.
However, it sounds as if it is only a decision by the Russians not to shoot down a civilian passenger plane with sabotage. Do they have the ability to do so?
The reason why the US has been taking such serious action since the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion in Ukraine is certainly due to this: The White House does not want to push the Kremlin into a corner, forcing it to take military actions that it cannot control. This is clear. In the digital world, in which we live today, a enemy can become active on many fronts, for example in the cyber realm. We are not prepared for this and for many other things. Think of the arson attacks in Berlin recently.
A building of the defense contractor Diehl caught fire due to a technical defect.
Suspicion falls on Russia, yet the incident is hardly discussed in German media. This surprises me. Is there evidence of Russian involvement? If so, what do we do about it? Another example: NATO recently admitted that in a serious scenario, it could only protect approximately five percent of its airspace on the eastern flank with available air defense.
They engage in command in war as a race: One side develops something new, the other side tries to quickly find a countermeasure or response. Is NATO still stuck in this process regarding Störsender? Do we not have an effective countermeasure?
Due to the peace dividend after the end of the Cold War, many capabilities have been dismantled. If we look at NATO, the air forces are still the most powerful, as many land forces, including many capabilities of air defense and the navy, have been disarmed by western countries. The development in other areas, such as the cyber realm and space, has largely been neglected by us in Europe. Russia, but also China, Iran, and others have significantly armed themselves during the time we have been disarmed. The question arises: Do we still have parity of forces? Can we deter them at all?
What is your answer?
Let's take Germany as an example. In certain capability areas in different domains, the Bundeswehr, as well as other western armies, have limited or at least restricted capabilities. The Bundeswehr recently launched two spy satellites into space. According to recent media reports, they do not function. What might the Russians be thinking about that? At the beginning of the year, a British submarine conducted an atomic weapons test with a non-nuclear missile that did not work properly. The missile left the water, spun around in a circle, and fell back into the water. For the second time in a row. In our living democracies, this is all openly discussed. But we cannot be naive, as Russia is naturally observing us.
Different problems can be explained differently. But is there a fundamental weakness in western defense that contributes to such problems?
The following problem: In the past 20 years, the West has produced weapons due to engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan that did not need to be protected against electromagnetic interference in the weapon's field.
Was the Taliban lacking the capabilities to attack in this domain?
Exactly. But now we are facing an adversary on equal footing. That's something completely different, and suddenly we realize: The precision-guided Excalibur grenades, for example, no longer function properly against Russian Störsender. Of the 100 grenades, only six reach their target. If our precision weapons were still effective for the Ukrainians, we would have images of destroyed Russian military bases on the Crimea and in other regions every week. But we don't. We have them once a month.
Are the Russian rockets and cruise missiles interfering with the precision of our Western weapons?
It is so. The Russian side seems to master the electromagnetic field very well. They have traditionally been well-positioned there, have further developed their capabilities, and manage to produce highly efficient systems at very low costs. Old glide bombs are turned into long-range weapons with immense destructive power for a few hundred euros with an affordable add-on. If you were to buy a comparable effective system from a Western weapons manufacturer, you would face a huge production cost, receive a weapon with a fancy name like "Joint Direct Attack Munition" or similar, and pay millions for it. But the Russians produce significantly more effect with less money, and the weapons manufacturers cannot keep up.
Can Western weapons like Storm Shadow or HIMARS not be reloaded to become immune to the emitters?
This is being attempted, but it doesn't work as quickly. The manufacturers have to gather their technicians and first figure out how the Russians operate: Which frequency bands do they use? What systems do they have? What can be developed as a countermeasure? In peacetime, such a process takes years, if not decades. This process is currently being accelerated, but it still takes months. Individual suppliers are already showing products at arms fairs that can counter Russian systems. However, these are not yet tested. They are being used in Ukraine, but it's only one or two systems on a frontline of 1200 kilometers. There is a lack of quantity. And there is no availability in their own armed forces yet.
Interview with Markus Reisner by Frauke Niemeyer
- The Russian advance in Donbass has resulted in the takeover of two settlements, Nowoolexandriwka and Spirne, according to Russian army reports, despite Ukraine's denial. These locations are strategically important, being part of the areas of Tschassiw Jar and Otscheretyne, where the Russians are making significant progress.
- The Kremlin's interference with GPS signals over Eastern Europe has affected 142 transportation and surveillance flights of the Royal Air Force in the first four months of the year, according to a British data analysis. Russia is held responsible for disrupting every fourth British flight in the region.
- While the Ukrainians are managing to hold the Russians at bay in some areas, such as Lipzy, the Russians and Ukrainians are engaged in intense fighting in other places, like Wowtschansk, where the Russians recently even had to withdraw a paratrooper brigade. This demonstrates the complex nature of the conflict in Ukraine, with both sides making progress and facing setbacks.
