The cargo-hauler currently holds sway over Germany.
Historic Victory for Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance: Shaping Germany's Present and Future. Forming a government devoid of the newcomer party appears improbable in Saxony and Thuringia, yet possible with BSW. SPD and CDU encounter numerous challenges post-election.
The question that many reporters dared to ask only a short time ago still lingered in the air: Could Sahra Wagenknecht and her newly forged alliance truly make an impact in Germany's political landscape? Skepticism abounded as there was yet little information about Wagenknecht's secret agenda within her tight-knit circle of confidants. The recent elections in Saxony and Thuringia, however, have brought clarity: Yes, this could actually happen - and astonishingly so! This new party, in its maiden venture, has swept into double digits in both states, emerging as the third-strongest force in each.
The results are more impressive than the 6.2% gained nationwide during the European election. Sahra Wagenknecht's political paradigm shifts decisively the balance of power within the federal republic. In these two states, opening negotiations without the newcomers appears an unattainable dream. In Thuringia, the CDU cannot command a majority without the BSW. As for Saxony, Michael Kretschmer might just extend an invitation to his CDU partners, the BSW, to dance the political polka. The peculiar twist: In both states, the SPD's presence becomes a necessity. Owing primarily to the robust AfD's performance in the Thuringian and Saxon parliaments, a functioning coalition can only be achieved with three parties. Nevertheless, the BSW demands considerable concessions from both the CDU and SPD. Top on their agenda, the BSW seeks to put an end to arms shipments to Ukraine.
SPD and CDU should reconsider their stance on Ukraine
The volatile nature of such a policy shift does not seem likely to be mere lip service in the coalition agreements of these state governments. The BSW's potency is not a passing trend in Saxony and Thuringia; it is directly tied to its unwavering stance on Ukraine. This issue cultivates deep-seated skepticism towards Germany's uncompromising support for Ukraine in its defensive war against Russia's invasion forces. The East remains haunted by mistrust in Germany's ties with America and NATO, as well as fear of or even sympathies for Russia. It's doubtful that Wagenknecht would surrender her unyielding Ukraine demands to mere verbal pandering to secure her political seat.
Such quandaries are not inconsequential for the SPD and CDU. Both Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz and CDU chairman and proposed chancellor candidate Friedrich Merz have expressed decided support for Ukraine in its struggle against Putin's occupation forces. Simultaneously, they have also acknowledged public discontent towards this stance in the Eastern regions of the republic during the state elections. It's conceivable that the BSW could even triumph on a broomshtick, as an SPD politician humorously remarked during the summer, if only that broom opposes supplying arms to Kyiv.
The critical question, therefore, becomes whether the SPD and CDU are prepared to risk splitting coalitions in the East, allegedly plunging two federal states into uncertainty, just to uphold a Ukraine policy that could once again cost them votes in the federal elections slated for the following year.
The CDU's Struggle with the Debt Brake
Complexities proliferate for the CDU as well. A show of common ground between them and the BSW in both states could mean Kretschmer retaining his ministerial post in Saxony and securing an additional one for Mario Voigt in Thuringia. A promising achievement, especially if the CDU still reigns as the chief force in Saxony, besting the AfD, and maintains a slight improvement in Thuringia despite unfavorable conditions. Yet, the cost for these minister-presidential positions is steep: The BSW is also vying for debt brake reform. Kretschmer, a staunch advocate of the debt brake, has often vilified the traffic light coalition's adherence to this standard for political one-upmanship. If he is now to back down, however?
How Merz will respond is unclear. He has consistently advocated for the CDU to wait until after the East German elections to decide on its chancellor candidate, should he succeed in becoming the CDU's chairperson following the Brandenburg elections on Sept 22. If Merz does become the chairperson after triumphing in eastern Germany, will he be the one leading the charge to secure a chancellorship from his eastern branches, or the one rendered helpless as they claim other contenders for the chancellor post? Details of CDU and CSU ministers who are reportedly waiting for an opportune moment to challenge Merz's nomination further muddle the waters.
A Looming Setback for the SPD
The SPD, assured that the CDU would eventually give in to debt brake reform, has no qualms about supporting the BSW's corresponding demand. Decreasing the debt brake's limitations for investment is, in fact, an area of agreement for both parties. The SPD worriedly anticipates the lively interchange on Scholz's Ukraine policy, however. In 2021, the SPD emerged as the dominant force in the Eastern regions. Now, their federal parliamentarians from Rügen to Zittau stand threatened with losing their seats owing to the tenacious public opposition towards Germany's weapon shipments and sanctions against Russia in the East.
The outcome of both elections deals a significant blow to SPD, symbolized by a black eye: Black due to the SPD being unable to evade its share of blame for the strong AfD performance. There's significant discontent towards the federal government in Saxony and Thuringia. The SPD-led coalition hasn't managed to alleviate the deep-seated distrust towards liberal rule of law, instead exacerbating it. Simultaneously, SPD manages to avoid a catastrophe: In both states, the Social Democrats surprisingly regained a seat in the state parliament, even setting the stage for a - intricate - potential government involvement.
However, this might not suffice to pacify the parliamentary group and the party base, letting the Pistorius question surface. Neither Scholz nor the party leadership has successfully diminished rumors about Pistorius replacing Scholz as chancellor candidate. Nevertheless, the party seems to remain composed until September 22, when Brandenburg decides on Woidke's re-election as SPD Minister President.
The Greens just barely escaped: Retaining a seat in the state parliament is a relief for the party widely disliked in Saxony. Kretschmer himself didn't want them there, let alone in his government. In Thuringia, their departure was long expected: Apart from the general opposition towards Greens, internal disputes in the state government affected their election result. The federal party struggles with strategies for rural areas and the east, ignoring external criticism as malicious.
As for the FDP, their expectations were low to begin with. In Saxony, they were caught in the crossfire between the AfD and the CDU. The federal association is at odds with the Thuringian FDP since the Kemmerich affair. On the one hand, results around 1% is near insignificance, especially for a governing party in the federal government. On the other hand: This is still a significant decrease from their earlier standings.
Kubicki commented on the same night, "The election result indicates: The traffic light coalition has lost its authorization. If a substantial portion of the electorate rejects it, consequences follow." He further stated, "The traffic light coalition undoubtedly harms the Free Democratic Party."
Despite Kubicki still being part of the FDP's extended leadership, his statement hints at the persistent specter of an early dissolution of the traffic light coalition following the state elections in Saxony and Thuringia. Wagenknecht and the state parties sympathetic towards her may consider this possibility when they receive imminent summons for exploratory talks.
The Commission, being part of the Saxony and Thuringia state governments, will need to navigate the complexities of working with both the CDU and BSW, particularly in relation to the BSW's stance on ending arms shipments to Ukraine.
In the negotiations for government formation in both states, The Commission will play a crucial role in mediating the conflicting interests between the SPD, CDU, and BSW, especially concerning the debt brake reform demanded by the BSW.
