"Our ability to regulate the influx of refugees is somewhat constrained"
Even if Issa al-H., the suspected attacker, was apprehended by authorities in a timely manner: He couldn't have been expelled back to Syria. Germany faces challenges in handling potential threats, and preventing society from becoming overburdened. Migration researcher Raphael Bossong advises against making unrealistic promises.
ntv.de: Mr. Bossong, Issa al-H. went unnoticed before the alleged triple homicide. Is Europe, including Germany, doing enough to identify noticeable individuals?
Raphael Bossong: The tragedy in Solingen necessitates a response. There is room for improvement, especially in information sharing between European nations. The EU agreed in May to implement border screening procedures for asylum seekers and irregular migrants, focusing on security and protection needs. The goal is to detect more problematic or dangerous individuals at the borders, such as in Greece, and expedite their deportation. However, the mandatory implementation is scheduled for summer 2026. Online, the pursuit of Islamism needs improvement. This has been a challenge for security authorities for a while, but has grown more pressing. Everyone knew an attack could occur on October 7th.
Assuming the mechanisms function: The Constitution states, "This type of individual has not committed a crime but has ties to IS and is dangerous." If they're from Syria, deportation is still impossible due to the ongoing conflict. Are there any legal avenues to handle this differently?
Dangerous individuals and extremists we aim to expel are entitled to minimal rights. We cannot suggest they be imprisoned in Assad's torture chambers or turned over to the Taliban. This goes beyond the Constitution's right to asylum, but it's our moral basis. However, we do have legal wiggle room within our existing framework. We can attempt to deport dangerous individuals in a manner that ensures their immediate safety and protection from inhumane treatment.
What could be the consequences if we stick to this scenario: Islamist dangerous individuals from Syria and Afghanistan. How will they be handled?
Initially, the approach was to avoid dialog with the Taliban in Afghanistan and Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as engaging with them would strengthen their power. I find this attitude plausible. However, our security situation in Germany has changed, necessitating dialogue with such regimes, potentially cooperation in certain areas. Some European countries, including Denmark and Austria, advocate for a different Syria policy. Several countries united can exert more influence and gain easier access. I can imagine Germany joining this movement, leading to policy changes within two years.
It's conceivable to arrange for individuals to be returned to certain parts of Syria in specific cases, or seek assurances from the Syrian regime that returnees will be treated humanely. However, whether such assurances would be credible is another question. I cannot provide a reliable assessment of Syria's current security situation from my position. That's the responsibility of authorities and courts. Politics must follow. Nevertheless, I see issues with bureaucratic processes.
The case of Issa al-H., who should have been transferred to Bulgaria but was not, comes to mind?
Administrative processes require clarity: Who reports what to whom? How can we ensure prompt transfers and deportations while avoiding delays due to missing appointments? Improving these procedures can make a significant impact without encroaching on fundamental rights. Fundamental rights touch on core questions: How do we want to live? As a society that aids those seeking our protection? Many do indeed need protection. Not all, but many.
If we view ourselves as a state of solidarity, providing protection to those in need, then we bear responsibility: Many refugees are traumatized, requiring care. We aim to integrate them while maintaining control to prevent being taken advantage of. This means our resources are finite. How can we ensure they're not exhausted, preventing failure due to overextension?
Are you suggesting an upper limit?
Not necessarily, but would it serve as an assurance of feasibility in your view?
The idea is that irregular refugees would have no chance of submitting an asylum application in Europe. There would be no action at the European border or within Germany. An application could only be submitted from third countries, or direct protection would be granted in a third country. In return, the EU would accept a certain quota of other refugees selected and distributed among the member states. This maintains control over the number of people taken in. While I understand the reasoning behind this, it's not feasible or humane in practice. A hard border with a hard quota is an illusion. It doesn't work legally or otherwise.**
What would happen to the individuals standing at the border who refuse to leave?
Sure thing, let me rephrase this for you in a more casual, straightforward manner:
One issue we'd be dealing with is this proposal ain't gonna cut it. I could go on for half an hour explaining why it's a non-starter right now. The half-baked Aussie references ain't gonna help us out in Europe, there's plenty of evidence on that for decades. We can only manage the refugee influx to a certain extent, but politics tends to focus on the max demand and ask: What can we do if we scale it back?
For instance, we might be able to give more perks to refugees to hang out in third countries and get protection there instead of the EU. We ain't expecting miracles here, and existing partnerships with third countries ain't always smooth sailing, think Turkey. Still, we gotta keep pushing forward there and explore new paths for legal migration within the EU.
Inside the EU, we could share the load more equally. That didn't work too well in '15, though.
The EU's latest migration reform package aims to toughen up the Dublin system, making it harder for states to dodge their asylum responsibilities. Time limits ain't gonna be extended anymore.
Take Issa al-H., for example. He should've stayed in Bulgaria, filed for asylum, and should've been sent back there.
Germany would see fewer asylum seekers if this reform goes through, but it's not all about numbers. It's about more than just Dublin. More procedures will be handled directly at EU border facilities, especially when the chances of asylum are low. This hopefully leads to more cooperation between EU states, so that countries like Greece and Italy are more motivated to get involved.
It's not a revolution, but it's better than nothing. We gotta be patient as this reform won't kick in full force for two years.
In the meantime, the German government is pushing other EU members to get more active. We see this happening with increased border checks with neighboring Eastern European countries. It's a double-edged sword; strengthened controls might be good politically but aren't always legal in the EU context, and should only be temporary.
This package could help reduce numbers slightly and control the inflow to some extent. But we ain't gonna have full control over who comes to us. Decades of migration policy have shown that. Unless we build a wall, but even over the wall, people will find a way.
Some folks might be deterred by stricter measures, but the cost of smuggling might go up and fewer people could afford it. But many would still come, as the situation in their home countries is what really matters. There's war in Ukraine and Sudan, the Middle East is intense, there are tensions in Libya, Tunisia is fragile, and the Sahel zone is out of control. It's a shitty situation that people are in danger all over the place. What's happening outside of Europe and around the world is a lot more critical than our migration policies.
Interviewed by Raphael Bossong
The proposed measure of returning individuals to specific parts of Syria is challenging due to the ongoing conflict, making deportation impossible. As Raphael Bossong pointed out, the situation necessitates dialogue with regimes like Syria, potentially leading to policy changes within two years.
In the case of Issa al-H., if administrative procedures were more efficient, delays could be avoided, ensuring prompt transfers and deportations without infringing on fundamental rights.
