Investigation unveils absence of proof that Hawaii authorities took precautions against the Maui wildfire that claimed 102 lives despite alerts
Honolulu (AP) — In an analysis of the emergency actions taken during the wildfire that claimed 102 lives on Maui last year, investigators concluded on Friday that they discovered "no indications" that Hawaii authorities had taken any actions to prepare for the event, despite numerous advance warnings about the impending critical fire weather conditions.
The absence of a well-prepared strategy negatively impacted the evacuation efforts in the historic town of Lahaina before it was engulfed by the flames, according to the report issued by the state attorney general.
On August 4, 2023, a meteorologist from the National Weather Service sent a rare, in-advance alert to fire managers about the potential hazardous weather conditions that would emerge on August 8, featuring extreme winds due to a hurricane passing far to the south. The report released by the state attorney general featured these details.
Regrettably, in the days that followed, the analysis uncovered no evidence that crucial agencies such as the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency, Maui Fire Department, Maui Police, and others had devised strategies for confronting escalated wildfire threats, such as assigning additional personnel, positioning emergency vehicles and supplies in high-risk areas, or mapping out potential evacuation routes.
The passionate nature of the email, if shared with other states with better-developed severe weather emergency strategies, could have served to draw attention, promote discussion and put a plan into action, the report argued. "It called for the fire managers in Hawaii to prepare for the upcoming extreme weather," it read.
Firefighters and law enforcement officers, who displayed great valor in escorting residents door-to-door to warn them to evacuate, had their efforts undermined by the lack of planning, as the deadliest wildfire in a century decimated thousands of structures.
Attorney General Anne Lopez commented, stating, "This investigation should serve as a stark reminder to the state and county authorities to learn from the past and take prompt, decisive action to prepare for the future."
Maui’s mayor noted that the report would help the county better respond to disasters and save lives.
The Hawaii Emergency Management Agency did not immediately respond with a comment.
Maui fire officials consulted the forecast, but no evidence of pre-event preparation plans by the Maui Fire Department was discovered, the report said. The police and fire departments failed to establish a unified command center or a contingency plan, making it more challenging to keep tabs on who was responding, where to allocate resources, or which evacuation routes were obstructed by fallen trees or power lines.
The departments shared a mobile command vehicle, but the county did not provide any proof that it was deployed that day, the report said. Some emergency vehicles lacked equipment required to remove roadblocks.
Hawaiian Electric Co. acknowledged being responsible for a fire that started early on August 8. Firefighters who responded believed they had successfully extinguished the fire. However, according to the report, they had limited access to the area due to treacherous terrain and unstable power lines overhead, hindering their ability to determine if the fire was truly out.
The fire that consumed Lahaina later that day broke out in the same area. Maui County has not yet released its report on the cause of the catastrophe.
With numerous fires burning on Maui that day, the police focused on routine tasks such as traffic control rather than on preparations for an evacuation, the report said. The police and fire departments operated independently, resulting in communication difficulties as the winds blew down utility poles, causing power outages and cell service disruptions.
Maui County and the state rely on contractors to provide water tankers and heavy equipment for firefighting. However, these contractors were not trained on the use of portable radios, and without cell service many had to communicate with firefighters in person. Firefighters had to flag down water tankers to request their assistance in extinguishing fires. Some hydrants malfunctioned as the fire melted water lines.
Maui Fire Department regulations required backup relief engines to be ready for emergency response. However, some lacked breathing equipment and portable radios, the report said. Firefighters spent valuable time tracking down and loading hoses, nozzles, and hand tools at fire stations.
Even with the warnings, the heads of the county's emergency management agency and the Maui Fire Department were off-island that day, attending conferences in Honolulu. The report stated that no one seemed to be responsible for managing resources strategically.
Some of the issues that emergency responders and residents faced were unique to Hawaii and Maui, such as narrow roads that were clogged with parked cars and private dirt roads that were obstructed by gates.
Numerous older, wooden homes were scattered closely together, and residents frequently left windows open, facilitating the fire's spread.
The 518-page report, conducted by the Fire Safety Research Institute, is the second part of a three-part project aimed at understanding the tragedy and determining ways to prevent similar disasters in the future.
The review revealed that the lack of preparation was part of a broader trend of indifference toward wildfire risks in Hawaii, where tsunamis and hurricanes are considered more pressing concerns, and it was just one of several factors that contributed to the catastrophe.
Nationally, the report noted, Hawaii is often viewed as a tropical vacation destination, not a fire-prone area. Among residents, it may be difficult to generate enthusiasm for wildfire risk when "red-flag weather" (hot, dry, and windy) is not much different from a typical summer day.
"This gap between risk perception and reality seems to have contributed to a relative underinvestment in wildfire prevention, preparedness, and response capacity over the years," the report concluded.
Maui County enacted legislation in 2022, granting the fire department power to mandate property owners to clear vegetation like the combustible, invasive grasses that aided the Aug. 8 blaze. However, as per the report, "Maui County hasn't presented any proof that the MFD has implemented these amendments in the Lahaina region."
The report advocated for improved vegetation maintenance and creation of fire barriers, suggesting alternatives for firefighting water sources in severe situations, such as movable pumps to draw from pools, ponds, and the sea.
The Maui Police Department was urged to devise safe evacuation strategies, while the fire department was advised to develop protocols for handling adverse fire conditions, as per the report.
"It's time for things to shift, and readiness is where it begins," Derek Alkonis, from the evaluation team, expressed at a press conference on Friday.
Despite the warnings and potential hazardous weather conditions mentioned in the email, crucial agencies such as the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency and Maui Fire Department failed to develop strategies to confront escalated wildfire threats, which negatively impacted the responses during the wildfire. The lack of preparation from these agencies highlighted the need for us to learn from past events and take proactive measures to prepare for future calamities.
