In the Eastern region, the circumstances we're facing are typical in numerous European nations.
The elections in Thuringia and Brandenburg have concluded with exceptional victories for the AfD. What transpires next? Is collaboration between the CDU and the Left an option? And what's happening in these two federal states? Political scientist Benjamin Höhne provides insights on ntv.de.
Mr. Höhne, citizens in Saxony and Thuringia have cast their votes. In Thuringia, the AfD is the dominant force, and it's also close to a third of the votes in Saxony. Was this a bad day for democracy?
Indeed, right-wing populism pose threats to democracy. It has issues with the variety of parties and their viewpoints. It claims to be the sole genuine voice of "the people." Essentially, it denies its political rivals the right to exist. This is problematic for our democratic system. However, it's important to note that populism is part of democracy today. It's the unsavory side of democracy. The battle against right-wing populism is about keeping it contained.
Could one also say: Calm down, that's democracy. Unwanted outcomes are a part of it.
That could be said about any normal party that adheres to democratic rules. But with right-wing parties, we have a past that provides a clear indication of where this path leads. Currently, other European countries like Hungary serve as cautionary tales. In particular, the highest judicial bodies are a thorn in the side of right-wing populism. They limit its ambition to shape and set boundaries. Moreover, it attacks the very foundations of pluralistic democracy and public or private media.
Does this also apply to the alliance of Sahra Wagenknecht? Her party also relies on populism.
This is debatable. We don't yet know the direction the party will take. It's difficult to categorize it as either left or right. I faced criticism from the BSW camp after identifying signs of an anti-system party in our last conversation. However, I believe Mrs. Wagenknecht would not disagree with such an assessment. There appears to be a growing number of Germans who are unable to comprehend the current democracy. Wagenknecht is also tapping into this demographic - perhaps with noble intentions. But she also avoids taking responsibility for unserious slogans, such as on the Ukraine war, which does not permit a political solution even at the state level.
The federal trend always plays a role in state elections. Many commentators say that the election result contained a lot of dissatisfaction with the traffic light policy. What do you think?
This perspective has been strategically constructed by conservative circles. But why does the AfD benefit from the traffic light dispute, but hardly the Union as the strongest opposition party? Certainly, the traffic light coalition did not provide a remarkable boost for the SPD, Green, and FDP candidates. However, attributing the strengthening of the AfD solely to it would be an oversimplification. There are numerous reasons, both on a European scale, that we could discuss at length. A regional reason: Many people in the east do not feel that they can influence democracy to their advantage.
The Greens and the FDP were viewed as Western imports in the East from the outset. They have few members and a sparse voter base. Such a broad, diverse movement milieu, in which the Greens were established in the old Federal Republic, never existed in the East. The classic bourgeois FDP clientele must also be sought for a long time in the east. The SPD was newly founded in 1990. Unlike the CDU, it could not rely on party structures from the GDR, which was a one-party state. The SPD clearly distanced itself from the PDS and could not attract any member influx from the former SED. It could hardly rely on traditional collaborative organizations such as trade unions.
But this also applies to Brandenburg or Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, where the SPD is much stronger.
In Brandenburg, the SPD was able to establish something like a homeland base. This is likely due to the previous top personnel. Manfred Stolpe successfully carved out a "Father of the Land" image in the 1990s. It certainly helped that he was a minister-president who hailed from the east. His SPD politician and social minister, Regine Hildebrandt, was also highly popular, beyond her federal state boundaries.
What do you think about Thuringia? The only viable governing possibility would now be CDU, SPD, BSW, and the Left, or with the Left's tolerance. Is the incompatibility decision against the CDU against the Left still valid?
No. The CDU should abandon the incompatibility decision against the Left Party. I have already proposed this in the spring of this year. The CDU aims to govern. This is a defining aspect of its self-perception. It sees itself as a problem-solver that manages public affairs pragmatically. It takes no joy in ideological fundamental disputes. Therefore, it is politically adaptable in coalitions. No revolution has come from the Left. Instead, social democratic policies have been pursued in Thuringia. The CDU is aware of this, of course. It must now decide what is the lesser evil for it: to work with Ramelow's Left Party or to maintain the outdated communist enemy image and be a tool for Höcke's rise to power.
Apart from that: Would that be a good idea? How should that work with three or even four parties?
That will be challenging. There's no sugarcoating it. The current Minister President Bodo Ramelow could indeed play a moderating role in the integration of his own party.
If now supporters of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) argue: The largest fraction should also lead the government, would that really be incorrect? The Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD) have often stated this as well.
Certainly, such viewpoints can be understood. However, our democracy is a parliamentary one. If a party fails to achieve an absolute majority of mandates, it requires coalition partners to form a government. In this regard, the AfD has made it easier for the CDU to draw a line. The AfD has not significantly moderated itself, but has remained firmly rooted in its hard-right core around Höcke, which continues to send signals into the right-wing extremist spectrum. This has a deterrent effect in the middle of society.
After the attack in Solingen, the AfD did not see significant growth. Has its ceiling of approximately one-third of the votes been reached?
Some of my colleagues advocate for this theory. Others, on the other hand, feared that the AfD could have profited even more from Solingen. Voter turnout increased, and there was a counter-mobilization. Smaller parties, including the CDU, benefited from this.
In the German debate, the East is often treated as a special case in Germany. But isn't it rather Western Germany that is the special case in Europe?
Indeed, one could argue that. What we experience in the East with values of 30% or more for right-wing populists or extremists is normal in many European countries. In Western Germany, the established party system remains quite robust because parties are deeply rooted in society. The CDU and CSU continue to have a strong Christian democratic party community, and the SPD still claims to be a people's party. Parties that consistently attract so many voters are rare in other European countries.
Should AfD supporters be treated as lost sheep that need to be brought back to the democratic fold, or as dangerous voters of right-wing extremists?
Parties will always try to persuade people of their own ideology and win back voters from other parties. However, the success of this is questionable. A person with firmly held right-wing extremist views is unlikely to vote for a normal party like the CDU. It will also be challenging to bring back people with right-wing populist views if they were not already mobilized by the AfD from the non-voting population. In right-wing circles, they cultivate conspiracy theories and crude worldviews, complain about "gendering," and stir up hatred against people with a migration background. Right-wing populist narratives eventually form a veil over one's perception of reality. It is hard to imagine that someone would simply shed all this and start anew with the SPD, for example.
The Bavarian Socialist Party (BSW) entered both state parliaments with a two-digit figure, but this has not harmed the AfD, but rather the Left. How can this be explained?
The right-wing populist "Wagenburg mentality," as Marcel Lewandowsky called it, keeps the "AfD sentiment community," a term coined by Florian Spissinger, together. Most AfD voters did not see a reason to switch. A core voter base has formed as we know it from other parties. These are loyal voters who remain faithful to their party despite negative headlines.
Not a few in the East felt that the parties from the West were imposed upon them in the 1990s. This is different with the AfD. From the beginning, members had the opportunity to shape the party life, make directional and even personnel decisions themselves. There was a great openness to the street, to movements like Pegida. The AfD has a very high degree of internal party democracy. Procedures for internal will-formation are transparent and inclusive. Members have little to fear for criticizing right-wing statements. These organizational framework conditions positively affect identification with the AfD and strengthen its concentration function in the right spectrum.
Is the AfD a democratic party, despite being often criticized as not democratic?
In its internal organization, it is even particularly democratic. But not in its understanding of democracy at the state level. There, it is anti-pluralistic and thus anti-democratic.
For a government participation, Wagenknecht expects a common line in foreign policy. Can it be more than just warm words? The federal states have no influence on foreign policy.
Correct, foreign policy is the domain of the federal government. Ms. Wagenknecht may hope to indirectly influence the next federal government through her likely coalitions. However, I believe it was just election rhetoric to gain votes.
In Saxony, the CDU, with Michael Kretschmer at the helm, finished ahead of the AfD. What did they do differently than in Thuringia? Was it Kretschmer's constant presence with countless local visits and conversations? Explain, discuss, "take along"? Is this the model that works?
His tireless activity certainly contributed to becoming a well-known and popular minister-president. He wants to be close to the people and is diligent in this regard, probably as no other minister-president in Germany. However, there is also criticism. He may sometimes lean towards those he meets on these visits. Among them are likely to be organized individuals involved in right-wing networks. Dissatisfied people who have been mobilized by the AfD. When he expresses pro-Russian views, he knows it resonates in such circles.
Do we have to get used to minority governments, or will things return to normal?
There's a chance we might witness dominant majorities in two-party alliances once more, but the vibe is shifting: towards more adaptable voting patterns and a more fluid party spectrum. The likelihood of minority governments has increased. In Saxony, it's not really on the cards, but it's more probable in Thuringia. The hiccup here is: If a minority government emerges with the CDU at its core, it could serve as a gateway for the AfD to influence government decisions. Certain elements within the CDU's second or third tiers in the east might even contemplate collaborating with the AfD to some extent.
Volker Petersen had a chat with Benjamin Höhne
The rise of right-wing populism, as demonstrated by the AfD's victories in Thuringia and Saxony, poses significant threats to democracy. It's important to note that populism is a part of democracy today, but the battle against it is about containing it and preventing it from eroding the foundations of pluralistic democracy.
In the case of the alliance of Sahra Wagenknecht's party, its reliance on populism is debatable. The party's direction is yet to be determined, and it's not easily categorized as either left or right. However, some of its actions and slogans, such as its stance on the Ukraine war, do not permit a political solution even at the state level.
Referring to the alliance of Sahra Wagenknecht's party.
