"Fighter jets will not decide this war"
ntv.de:In your book on air warfare,you write that the past century has shown that success in a war is unlikely if military means are used without capabilities in the air. What does this mean for the Ukrainian army and its defensive war against Russia?
Frank Ledwidge: I think we - myself included - have tended to impose our own perspectives on Russia.
You have to explain that.
At the beginning of the war, we in the West assumed that Russia would try to completely destroy the Ukrainian air force and that no Russian soldier would cross the border beforehand. But that is not how they proceeded, because Russia has a different view of the air force. They see the air force more as support for the forces on the ground, not as an equal. This is a very different approach to that of NATO. We see the air force as the primary arm of our armed forces, paving the way and preparing the conditions on the battlefield. Members of the other branches of the armed forces within NATO may disagree, have objections to this position or would at least like to comment. But essentially this is NATO's idea of the air force.
And the Ukrainians?
I think the Ukrainians have started to see things in a similar way to NATO. This may not apply to the Ukrainian army, but many Ukrainians assume that fighter jets like the F-16 and the Swedish Gripen that they are to receive will make a decisive difference. In my opinion, they will not. In my view, the war in Ukraine shows the absolutely central role of ground-based air defense systems. Since the Second World War, as far back as the last year of the Second World War, the vast majority of aircraft shot down in combat have been shot down from the ground. This pattern has become increasingly clear over the decades and is currently reaching its peak in Ukraine.
In what way?
Essentially, in the war in Ukraine, both sides are denying the other's air force access to the battlefield by deploying very powerful ground-based air defense systems.
And you believe that the F-16 or other types of combat aircraft are not that important for Ukraine?
They will not be decisive. They are useful, but with the numbers the Ukrainians are likely to get, they will certainly not be decisive.
When Chancellor Scholz is asked about the German Taurus cruise missiles, he usually says that air defense systems such as Patriot are much more important. Would you agree with him?
Yes, I think that's absolutely right. This goes back to what I said about the importance of ground-based air defense: This war is about denying the enemy access to airspace as much as possible. Ukraine is particularly concerned with protecting the civilian population from the consequences of Russian bombing terror. Ukraine must understand that it is on the defensive. I don't think it has internalized this yet, but I think the Chancellor is right.
Is it possible to win a war without gaining air superiority?
Well, the Taliban and the insurgents in Iraq didn't have air superiority and they won their wars. So I would say that it is quite possible to win a war without air superiority.
However, Ukraine is not fighting a war of insurgency. It's more of a traditional war.
That's true, but Ukraine has not lost control of the air. If it had, it would be in serious trouble. Instead, Ukraine is very effectively using drones and other unmanned systems to make up for its lack of aircraft. What we are seeing in Ukraine is mutual air denial. This is quite new, it hasn't happened for a long time, if ever. Neither side can achieve air superiority. This shows that control of the air is important - but it is even more important to ensure that it is not left to the enemy.
Conversely, is it possible to win a war through air warfare alone?
No. There are two cases that are usually cited to argue that a war can only be won with air power: the First Iraq War in 1991, where allied air strikes were the main cause of destruction on the part of Iraqi forces. And the war in Kosovo in 1999, when NATO forced Serbian President Milošević to stop his ethnic cleansing. However, both wars were not fought from the air alone. In the First Iraq War, victory had to be consolidated by ground troops. And in the Kosovo war it was essentially the same, because NATO's approach ultimately also involved the use of ground troops.
You have already pointed out that wars of insurgency cannot be won from the air. What does this mean for Israel's current war against Hamas?
The Israelis would certainly not say that the air force can win the war against Hamas. Quite the opposite: strategically, the use of the air force can even be counterproductive for them.
Counterproductive?
It depends on how they use the air force. If Israel were to use its air force in an overtly indiscriminate way - and I don't think they have done that so far - then they might win on a tactical level. But politically, they would lose the war.
So the war between Israel and Hamas shows once again that air wars have their limits?
Exactly.
You are not only an expert on aerial warfare, but also a lawyer specializing in international humanitarian law. What does it mean when one side in a war feels bound by the law, but for the other, breaking the law is at the very heart of the strategy?
It means that this side faces major challenges. One of Hamas' main weapons - apart from the tunnel system - is the political impact of civilian casualties. We are dealing here with an information war that is superimposed on ground combat.
I have always believed that compliance with international humanitarian law is not just a question of ethics, of "we are better than them". In a world where information and propaganda play a major role, it is also a very practical question. That is why I am sure that Israeli commanders are under great pressure to minimize the terrible consequences of the war for the civilian population - if only to reduce the damage to Israel. As with Ukraine, US support for Israel is crucial. If this were to cease, Israel would be finished. I don't believe that this risk really exists, but even a reduction in US support would have serious consequences. That is why I am sure that every Israeli commander is told that every civilian killed is a blow against Israel.
Is it even possible to win a war against a particularly ruthless enemy?
That depends on how you define "winning". Israel certainly wants to destroy the military and governmental potential of Hamas. Is this goal jeopardized if Israel clearly does not comply with international humanitarian law? I would say yes, if this happens so clearly that it cannot be denied or is very difficult to defend. Hamas set a trap for Israel, and Israel fell right into it. But they had no other choice. Hamas - not the Palestinian people - is an existential threat to Israel.
Let's return to Ukraine. Do you believe in the assurances of Western heads of state and government, from Olaf Scholz to Rishi Sunak to Joe Biden, that they will support Ukraine "as long as it takes" - as long as it is necessary?
Absolutely not. We see the political restrictions that Biden and, to a lesser extent, Scholz, Sunak and the others are subject to. There are also practical restrictions in Europe; probably less so in Germany than in the UK. But fundamentally, Europe is constrained by the fact that there is not much left that could be delivered. That's not the case in the United States - the US could supply a lot more, both tanks and Patriot systems. They lack the political will. In any case, I don't see any real commitment there to help Ukraine achieve victory as it defines it.
The second reason is: what is the definition of "it" in "as long as it takes"? For example, I don't believe for a second that the United States would be in favor of a Ukrainian ground assault on Crimea. So is that part of the "it"? No. "It" means: as far as we are willing to go. This willingness is subject to internal constraints and external realities, such as the possibility that Putin could resort to nuclear weapons if Crimea were to be recaptured from Ukraine.
Does this mean that Putin's strategy will work in the end: playing for time because he assumes that the West will not be able to sustain its support for Ukraine?
On a strategic level it looks like it will, as there seems to be a stalemate in the fighting and Ukraine cannot be expected to make major gains in territory as the West limits the extent of its arms supplies. As for the UK, I'm pretty sure we have no significant arms left to give to Ukraine. It may be slightly different in Germany, but broadly speaking it's the same pattern. From Putin's point of view, playing for time could lead to Ukraine being further strengthened, but Russia would also become stronger during this time. That's why I don't see any realistic scenario other than a protracted war, as we've seen so far.
Hubertus Volmer spoke with Frank Ledwidge
Source: www.ntv.de
