Fatal Drownings of Two Navy SEALs in Somalian Waters deemed Preventable, as per Navy Inquiry
During a nocturnal seizure of a vessel transporting Iranian weapons to Yemen, Leading Petty Officer Christopher Chambers and Naval Special Warfare Operator 1st Class Nathan Ingram encountered rough seas while attempting to board. Chambers, heading the platoon, tumbled off the ship's side, while Ingram leapt into the water immediately to provide assistance.
Loaded with equipment for the covert operation, the two Navy SEALs submerged within minutes. Chambers reappeared sporadically at the surface for just 26 seconds; Ingram was seen intermittently for 32 seconds.
The ordeal, recorded by the inquiry, lasted a mere 47 seconds, resulting in the loss of two esteemed Naval Special Warfare personnel to the ocean. Enveloped in gear and its accompanying weight, their physical condition and emergency flotation devices, even if deployed, were insufficient to keep them afloat.
The deliberations of Naval Special Warfare Command wrapped up a prolonged examination to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the drowning of two esteemed US military representatives, who had prepared meticulously for the mission.
Gen. Michael “Erik” Kurilla, the commander of US Central Command, wrote in his examination that these circumstances, marked by inherent problems, were avoidable. Both Chambers and Ingram were posthumously honored with promotions.
SEAL Team Three from Naval Special Warfare was deployed aboard the USS Lewis B. Puller in December 2023. Aware that their primary responsibility would entail marine interceptions, the team had successfully executed two boardings of dhows in daylight earlier that month, both in tranquil and turbulent seas.
In early January 2024, the military began tracking a lumbering dhow over several days. SEAL Team Three planned the interception of this vessel for around January 12, but a weather review and operation rehearsal resulted in a one-day advancement of the operation.
One team member, whose identification was redacted in the investigation report, voiced concerns about hastening the operation, as it seemed rushed. Furthermore, others preferred to postpone it to allow more time to prepare.
Despite these reservations, the investigation found that all members of the squadron responded affirmatively when asked if they were equipped to carry out the operation. Foreseeing challenging seas, the SEALs set off in approximately 6-to-7-foot waves, nearing the upper limit of 8 feet for a nighttime operation. The circumstances were so demanding that the boarding craft had to attempt three separate approaches. The first two attempts enabled six SEALs to board, but the third attempt proved more challenging. Since the dhow's crew had vacated the wheelhouse, it was rolling violently in the weather. Chambers, 37, plunged into the water during his attempt to board, and Ingram, 27, dove into the water after him in an effort to save him.
The Navy conducted search and rescue operations for ten days subsequent to the incident, covering an extensive search area of 48,600 square miles, but the divers were unable to recover Chambers and Ingram's remains.
Based on navy protocol, recovery and salvage efforts were abandoned, as the sea was deemed a fitting and final resting place for those who perished while serving in the Navy.
The investigation concluded that the Naval Special Warfare Force Readiness Manual underscores the significance of buoyancy but fails to provide explicit guidance on instigating a successful buoyancy test.
Before deployment, the SEALs performed buoyancy tests in the waters off San Diego, investigators revealed, but they omitted completing these tests once they had embarked.
The Navy emphasizes the necessity of "positive buoyancy," which signifies the ability to stay afloat, yet other resources focus on the requirement for "neutral buoyancy," that is, the ability to maintain balance in water. Ultimately, individual SEALs were responsible for determining the type of buoyancy necessary for a specific mission and configuring themselves accordingly, resulting in confusion and inadequate execution.
The SERE report disclosed that the SEALs had insufficient familiarity with the Tactical Flotation Support System, an emergency flotation device. It remains unclear whether the two drowned SEALs even attempted to activate the system.
The investigation suggested a series of corrective actions to rectify the "systemic problems" that precipitated the drownings, including instituting mandatory buoyancy requirements for missions, appraising the necessity of a foolproof flotation device, and conducting a review of lifesaving equipment aboard navy boarding vessels.
The politics surrounding the incident were hugely debated within Naval Special Warfare Command, with some arguing for stricter buoyancy protocols and increased training.
The lack of explicit guidance in the Naval Special Warfare Force Readiness Manual on conducting buoyancy tests was cited as a potential political issue, as it led to confusion among the SEALs.
