"Reaching maximum output" is how the West aims to surpass Putin in weaponry production.

Conflict in Ukraine - Aiming for peak production, the West aims to surpass Putin in terms of armaments.

Putin's military machine has deceived the West with falsehoods. In 2022, it was prophesied here that the industry would crumble due to Western sanctions, the Kremlin would run out of money as a result of export losses, and the combined effects of losses and conscription would turn the population against Putin. Instead, things took a different turn. Voluntary recruits are making up for the losses on the front, and the Russian military is not suffering a shortage of grenades, drones, or missiles, while the European defense industry is just beginning to awaken.

Russian defense at its peak

Although the situation might seem dismal, there is a glimmer of hope. Western analysts believe that Russia has now reached its "peak production" stage and further growth is not possible. Contrarily, in the case of vital equipment such as armored vehicles of all kinds, there could be a considerable decline in about two years. The takeaway: Ukrainian soldiers may have to endure an additional two years, at which point the situation on the front will likely improve.

Reuse and minimal new production

What provides support for this assumption? The theory is rooted in the way Russian production functions. With armored vehicles, as well as with trucks, there is only a minor percentage of brand-new production. The vast majority of output consists of models from stock. No T84 or T72 is entirely refurbished; instead, the foundation of the old model remains. The flaw in Russian production lies in this issue. When considerable losses have eroded the storage stocks, this form of reuse will come to an end. Before that, it will become increasingly difficult and expensive. At the start of the conflict, the best maintained models from the stock were used, but eventually, they had to resort to inferior resources.

According to the respected "Royal United Services Institute" (RUSI), "Russia can maintain a constant production through 2024, but it will be determined in 2025 that the vehicles will require a more extensive overhaul, and by 2026, most of the available stocks will have been depleted."

Storage stocks are not inexhaustible

Certainly, that's the plan. However, the Russian storage stockpiles are enormous. At the outset of the war, there were 7,000 T72 and 3,000 T80 in storage. These models constitute part of the reserve, as well as other stocks declared as waste. Russia has even commenced to reuse long-dormant T62. Tallying these figures, the idea still stands that these reserves will ultimately run out, which is accurate, but the time estimate appears overly optimistic.

Matters differ with highly sophisticated systems such as modern combat aircraft or surveillance aircraft. If Kyiv manages to inflict sustained casualties on the Russians in these categories, they could not be offset by refurbishing old jets. If Russia were forced to produce tanks and infantry fighting vehicles from scratch, the output would decrease simultaneously as the costs would rise. Constructing new assembly plants and production facilities is also costly and time-consuming. RUSI estimates a construction period of five years for a grenade factory.

However, some factors contradict this estimation. One major question is the losses of Ukraine, which must be compensated. If the Russians can still provide thousands of combat tanks, the quandary remains as to where Kiev should acquire similar quantities.

The revitalization of the asleep or better mummified giant is a testament to Russia's success. The structures and factories of the older Soviet defense industry, although dormant, still existed - albeit in a hibernating state. The companies went bankrupt one by one in the decade following 2010 or production ceased. Nevertheless, these ruins have been revived, allowing the Russian defense miracle to flourish.

New defense production

This cannot be replicated, but the Russians have also recognized the problem. The most noticeable evidence of this is the new defense minister Andrei Belousov. A capable economist, a tenacious technocrat, and, remarkably, an incorruptible individual in Putin's realm. He is charged with igniting the second phase of the mobilization of the war economy. His commitment to the task is unequivocal. In his pledge prior to his appointment, he vowed, "to devote all my energy, my health, and, if necessary, my life to the execution of the assigned tasks."

For this, a host of measures are necessary. In the area of heavy industry - bombs, grenades, and armored vehicles - a boost in production can only be achieved with new facilities. Recent events have shown that the T-80 tanks have already received new engines. The new production is already underway.

The analyst Patricia Marins reminds us of the financial predicament. The West spends four times more on central defense equipment than the Kremlin. She theorizes on "X": "Russia doesn't rely on rockets or land gains, but rather on the fact that they have created the infrastructure for a long war at a low cost and through control of supply chains." This cannot be the case in the EU.

The belief that the West will reach "peak production" faster than Russia is rooted in the assumption that private sector companies work more effectively than Putin's centrally-controlled economy. To simplify, Rheinmetall needs to rapidly ramp up artillery ammunition production and secure its supply chains. The wager is that this endeavor will be swifter in the West, where it can leverage China's machine tools and manufacturing expertise, and current contracts for raw materials. However, this reliance on external resources leaves some skepticism about the projected outcome.