Security failure opened the door to the Remmo clan
On November 25, 2019, members of the Remmo clan broke into the Dresden Residential Palace and escaped with jewels worth hundreds of millions. The perpetrators are highly professional - but without gigantic gaps in the museum's security network, the spectacular coup would probably have failed.
It was exactly four years ago to the day that Wissam Remmo and his accomplices stabbed the Free State of Saxony in the heart. In the early morning of November 25, 2019, their silver Audi A6 sped through Dresden, which was still asleep, across the Augustus Bridge, which was closed to cars, towards the freeway. The fact that the young men were in a hurry was due to their cargo: 21 pieces of jewelry set with more than 4,300 brilliant-cut diamonds and diamonds. This included an epaulette with a 50-carat brilliant-cut diamond - the "Saxon White". What Wissam Remmo and his accomplices had stuffed into their pockets a few minutes ago and were now hurrying out of the city was the treasure of Augustus the Strong.
We are talking about the burglary in the Historic Green Vault of the Royal Palace in Dresden - the biggest jewel theft of the past 100 years. At least two men broke into the former treasure chamber through a window, chopped the safety glass of the display cases with an axe and fled with millions in loot.
It has long been known that members of the Remmo clan, which is of Arab origin, were behind the crime. The Soko "Epaulette" was able to arrest six suspects quite quickly. Five of them have already been convicted: Wissam, Rabieh and Bashir Remmo to around six years in prison and the twin brothers Mohamed and Abdul Majed to a juvenile sentence. Thanks to a deal struck in court, some of the loot has even been returned to its rightful owner, the Dresden State Art Collections. However, there can be no talk of "all's well that ends well". Because while the investigation and damage limitation regarding the theft of the jewels worked, the details of the case paint a shocking picture of the museum's security precautions at the time.
"Camera technology was as good as 2005"
"The security culture in the Grünes Gewölbe was a medium disaster," summarizes journalist and author Thomas Heise in an interview with ntv.de. In the recently published book "Der Jahrhundertcoup" (The Coup of the Century), he and journalist Claas Meyer-Heuer have precisely reconstructed the perpetrators' actions and a number of security loopholes in the museum. For example, the perpetrators had an easy time breaking into the Green Vault. The window through which they gained access was not secured with an alarm. The burglars had already cut through the iron grille in front of the glass pane days earlier - without anyone noticing.
According to the journalists' research, they also had nothing to fear from surveillance cameras: The window was in a pitch-black corner. The castle's security concept did not include thermal imaging cameras, which could have been dangerous. That's why no one noticed the men pushing open the window with a kind of jack and entering the Green Vault.
"It was only when the men touched the floor that the floor scanners raised the alarm," explains Heise. It was 4.57 a.m. when a row of red stars popped up on the screens in the control center. The security guards noticed the intruders for the first time - they stared at the monitors in alarm. However, this was already the next problem: "You can see virtually nothing on the surveillance images, the perpetrators were only just vaguely recognizable," says Heise. The cameras were from 2005 - "it was like SD television, so to speak". The anachronistic technology had been known for a long time. "For almost 15 years, people philosophized about whether better cameras should be installed." However, this had obviously not happened by the end of 2019.
"Security staff were amazed themselves"
The fact that the events in the museum were still taking place in complete darkness did not necessarily help the pursuit of the perpetrators on the screens either. According to instructions, the security staff should have switched on the lights in the rooms that were attacked, but they did not do so, explains Heise. In the book, the authors summarize the events as follows: "The security guards in the control center were just as clueless as the burglars' plan."
Finally, another - particularly momentous - mistake was made by the security guards: none of them pressed the "hold-up alarm". If this button had been pressed, the police would have received a direct report. The police station was just 700 meters away, explains Heise. "They would have been there in no time." But the procedure in the security control center was different: the staff stared at the screens for around 40 seconds, "completely flabbergasted". "You got the impression that they were amazed at what was happening," says the author. The staff were well aware of the alarm button and how it worked. For example, a little girl who was visiting the control center once pressed it by mistake. "Within minutes, the residence lock was surrounded." If someone had pressed the alarm button that night, the authors assume that the perpetrators would have been caught.
Instead, the staff decided to dial 110. "A phone call like that naturally takes a certain amount of time," says Heise. "Precious seconds pass before someone says 'Hello, this is the police' and the crime is described." However, this is particularly important in the case of burglaries. A total of 96 seconds elapsed between the first alarm in the control center and the departure of two patrols from the police station. Too much, as it turned out shortly afterwards. By the time the officers arrived at the Green Vault, the display cases in the jewel room had long been in ruins. The burglars had already stowed away the jewelry, fled out of the window and jumped into their Audi, Heise and Meyer-Heuer reconstruct in their book. The police missed the perpetrators of this coup of the century by exactly 100 seconds.
Guards remained inactive
However, it may not only have been the security guards in the control center who could have prevented the perpetrators from escaping with the loot. Shortly before the crime, the security guards in front of the museum noticed athletic young men with hoods over their heads in front of the wall of the building, the authors write. However, the security guards did not take any action. "Of course you might think to call the police if you notice figures behaving conspicuously in Saxony's most important cultural center in the middle of the night," says Heise.
But why didn't this happen? Why did neither the security guards outside the museum react attentively nor did those in the control center act according to protocol? "It must have been a mixture of laziness, ignorance, laziness at night and coldness," says Heise about the behavior of the security guards in front of the Green Vault. It should also not be forgotten that the security staff are not particularly well paid.
There is also a certain operational blindness, especially among the security guards in the control center. "If you look at these monitors year in, year out, at some point you won't see anything." The author gives an example: "The surveillance cameras have already captured the men climbing over the wall of the museum before the break-in. These images were also sent to the control center. But nobody saw them that night. Or no one wanted to see them."
"Coup of the century for Saxon identity"
This chain of negligent decisions by staff and the museum's dilapidated security structure are shocking, and not just because of the immense value of the treasures on display. The insurance value of the jewelry taken by the burglars alone amounts to 116.8 million euros. However, according to Heise, their intangible value is at least as important. "This treasure from Augustus the Strong was incredibly important to the Saxons," says the author.
In fact, it was above all the former ruler of the Free State who was known as a generous builder and passionate collector and to whom Dresden owes its reputation as a magnificent Baroque city. "When the theft became known, people called the local press and cried on the phone," Heise continues. The burglary of the Green Vault is therefore "definitely also a coup of the century for Saxon identity".
Now it is up to the museum association to prevent another attack on the pride of Dresden as far as possible. In fact, four years after the historic theft of the jewels, there is not much left of the gigantic loopholes for criminals. The State Art Collections announced a new security concept to ntv.de. Among other things, a separate security department has been set up under the leadership of a former federal police officer. In addition, the structural and technical security measures have been revised, the museum association explains further. Security staff have also been increased and are being "permanently" trained and educated.
Sued security company remains on duty
However, there are also old acquaintances in the emphatically new concept. For example, Saxony has sued the security company that was active on the night of the crime for misconduct on the part of its employees. Nevertheless, the company will not be replaced, as it recently turned out. The reason: the company won the Europe-wide tender for the contract again.
The museum association emphasized to ntv.de that the employees of the security company who were on duty in the control center during the break-in no longer work for the company. The museum association rejects any general suspicion of the company. However, the company is "obliged to provide significantly higher quality".
"It's still somewhat bizarre, of course," Heise objects. "You sue the company and then hire them again for bureaucratic reasons. You can only shake your head at that."
Source: www.ntv.de
