The German commercial approach has reached its conclusion.
Struggles and turmoil are now the "regular deal," asserts security specialist Christian Mölling at the "Capital" prosperity event and portrays a gloomy portrait: "It's not simply a brief rainstorm."
Initially, Mölling alerts the crowd that he won't be presenting an optimistic image – his remarks can't be "swept under the rug." In fact, during his talk on the "new prominence of security" and its consequences for the economy, this security expert, who's just joined the Bertelsmann Foundation, provides a grim outlook: crises are everywhere, a sort of "new regular occasion." Germany's efficient business strategy is in its sunset, and solutions for this new scenario have yet to surface.
It was fitting to launch this year's "Capital" prosperity event in Frankfurt with Mölling's extensive security evaluation. In accordance with Mölling's reasoning, the fundamentals of our economy have shifted substantially – entrepreneurs and capital market investors ought to be cognizant of the modified conditions to thrive in business during these times.
What's new? To start, there's the revival of interconnected power resources – politics, economics, and technology – which had been forgotten in Germany. The political security scheme was set, and the end of the East-West conflict seemed like the "finish of history" for Germany in particular. Meanwhile, Germany's export-driven commercial model became "progressively successful." The state, in Mölling's words, created "preconditions for prosperity and economic actors – and nothing more."
However, globalization has reached its apex, and Germany is now amidst a global system conflict "where we recognize our role, but cannot truly participate." A notable aspect of this battle, Mölling explains, is the dissolution of the divide between economics and politics – rather than everyone playing fair, everything is exploited in geopolitical competition "to capitalize on the opposing side's vulnerabilities." Consider Russia's hybrid warfare or China's strategic sectors, which are also emerging as formidable competitors here.
Simultaneously, Mölling mentions a "security policy core meltdown" after years of underfunding, which might potentially threaten the state's legitimacy. Besides the global system conflict, Germany also wrestles with a "domestic weakness" that still hasn't been tackled despite the age of change.
What does this imply for the economy? First and foremost, we need to realize that this isn't a brief crisis: "It's not simply a passing shower," points out Mölling. The key term is transformation, not disaster: "This is a complete ecosystem overhaul."
Secondly, we ought to accept that the relationship between the state and the economy is currently under negotiation – and for entrepreneurs and investors, the question is "Do economic actors guide this, or are they modified?" Since, in principle, crises and exceptional situations provide the chance for change that would otherwise be unachievable – but only for those "who control the tools."
As a solution or guideline, this might be somewhat unsatisfying. However, at least Mölling poses significant, urgent questions – even if at the expense of pessimism.
This article was originally published on capital.de
Trade disputes are becoming a regular occurrence in the global system conflict, as Germany struggles to fully participate and navigate the exploitation of vulnerabilities in geopolitical competition. The ongoing transformation of the economy necessitates reconsidering the relationship between the state and economic actors, as crises provide opportunities for change, but only for those with the power to shape them.
